In this paper, we propose a new cybersecurity investment supply chain game theory model, assuming that the demands for the product are known and fixed and, hence, the conservation law of each demand market is fulfilled. The model is a Generalized Nash equilibrium model with nonlinear budget constraints for which we define the variational equilibrium, which provides us with a variational inequality formulation. We construct an equivalent formulation, enabling the analysis of the influence of the conservation laws and the importance of the associated Lagrange multipliers. We find that the marginal expected transaction utility of each retailer depends on this Lagrange multiplier and its sign. Finally, numerical examples with reported equilibrium product flows, cybersecurity investment levels, and Lagrange multipliers, along with individual firm vulnerability and network vulnerability, illustrate the obtained results.
Introduction
Supply chains have become increasingly complex as well as global and are now highly dependent on information technology to enhance effectiveness as well as efficiency and to support communications and coordination among the network of suppliers, manufacturers, distributors, and even freight service providers. At the same time, information technology, if not properly secured, can increase the vulnerability of supply chains to cyberattacks. Many examples exist of cyber attacks infiltrating supply chains with a vivid example consisting of the major US retailer Target cyber breach in which attackers entered the system via a third party vendor, an HVAC subcontractor, with an estimated 40 million payment cards stolen in late 2013 and upwards of 70 million other personal records compromised (see 21 ). Not only did Target incur financial damages but also reputational costs. Other highly publicized examples have in-cluded breaches at the retailer Home Depot, the Sony media company, and the financial services firm JP Morgan Chase. Energy companies as well as healthcare organizations as well as defense companies have also been subject to cyberattacks (cf. 32 and 33 ). In addition, the Internet of Things (IoT) has expanded the possible entry points for cyberattacks ( 3 ). Of course, cyberattacks are not exclusively a US phenomenon. According to Verizon's 2016 Data Breach Investigations Report, there were 2,260 confirmed data breaches in the previous year at organizations in 82 countries. Numerous other breaches, affecting small and medium-size businesses, have gone unreported and unanalyzed (cf. 40 ). In order to illustrate the scope of the negative impacts associated with cybercrime, it has been estimated that the world economy sustained $445 billion in losses from cyberattacks in 2014 (see 2 ). Numerous companies and organizations have now realized that investing in cybersecurity is an imperative. Furthermore, because of the interconnectivity through supply chains and even financial networks, the decisions of an organization in terms of cybersecurity investments can affect the cybersecurity of others. For example, according to Kaspersky Lab, a multinational gang of cybercriminals, known as "Carbanak," infiltrated more than 100 banks across 30 countries and extracted as much as one billion dollars over a period of roughly two years ( 23 ) . Gartner ( 27 ) and Market Research ( 25 ) report that organizations in the US are spending $15 billion for security for communications and information systems. Hence, research in cybersecurity investment is garnering increased attention with one of the first research studies on the topic being that of Gordon and Loeb (see 19 ). In this paper we consider a recently studied cybersecurity investment supply chain game theory model consisting of retailers and consumers at demand markets with each retailer being faced with a nonlinear budget constraint on his security investments (see 30 and 8 ). We present an alternative to this model in which the demand for the product at each demand market is known and fixed and, hence, the conservation law of each demand market must be fulfilled. The reason for introducing such a satisfaction of the demands at the demand markets is because there are numerous products in which demand is inelastic as in the case, for example, of infant formula, certain medicines, etc.
The supply chain game theory model with cybersecurity investments in the case of fixed, that is, inelastic, demands, unlike the models of 30 and 8 , is characterized by a feasible set such that the strategy of a given retailer is affected by the strategies of the other retailers since the product can come from any (or all) of them. Hence, the governing concept is no longer a Nash equilibrium (cf. 35 , 36 ) but, rather, is a Generalized Nash equilibrium (see, e.g., 41 and 14 ) . Recall that, in classical Nash equilibrium problems, the strategies of the players, that is, the decision-makers in the noncooperative game, affect the utility functions of the other players, but the feasible set of each player depends only on his/her strategies. It is worth mentioning that it was Rosen ( 37 ) who, in his seminal paper, studied a class of GNE problems. In 11 the authors show that the Rosen's class of GNE problems can be solved by finding a solution of a variational inequality. Moreover, the variational solution of a GNE problem with shared constraints has been derived in a general Hilbert space in 13 . In this paper, we make use of a variational equilibrium (cf. 12 and 22 ), which is a special kind of GNE. The variational equilibrium allows for a variational inequality formulation of the Generalized Nash equilibrium model. Notably, according to 24 and the references therein, the Lagrange multipliers associated with the shared (that is, the common) constraints are the same for all players in the game, which allows for an elegant economic interpretation. In our model, the demand constraints faced by the retailers are the shared ones, and we then fully investigate these and other relevant Lagrange multipliers We note that in the papers 30 and 8 the governing Nash equilibrium conditions are formulated in terms of a variational inequality and an analysis of the dual problem and its associated Lagrange multipliers is performed. In particular, in this paper, the influence of the conservation laws is analyzed and the importance of the associated Lagrange multipliers highlighted. The marginal expected transaction utility for each retailer depends on this Lagrange multiplier and its sign. For other papers on cybersecurity models see also 9 , 32 , 33 , 38 , whereas for other studies on the Lagrange theory and its application to variational models we refer to 5 39 . For recent research on Generalized Nash equilibrium models in disaster relief supply chains and in commercial supply chains, respectively, see 29 and 34 . In the paper 8 an analysis of the marginal expected cybersecurity investment utilities and their stability is performed and, hence, this paper adds to the literature on the study of marginal expected utilities, with a focus on both supply chains and cybersecurity investments, but in the more challenging setting of Generalized Nash equilibrium.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model, along with such concepts and firm and network vulnerability, define the variational equilibrium, and provide the variational inequality formulation. In Section 3 we construct an equivalent formulation by means of the Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints and the conservation law which define the feasible set. Then we prove the existence of the Lagrange multipliers associated with the equality and inequality constraints by applying the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions (see Theorem 3.1) . In Section 4 we analyze the marginal expected transaction utilities and we find that they depend on the Lagrange multipliers and their signs. In Section 5 we present detailed numerical examples which emphasize the importance of the Lagrange multipliers and of the inelastic demands in order to maximize the expected utilities. Finally, in Section 6, we present the conclusions and the projects for future research.
The Model
The supply chain network, consisting of retailers and consumers at demand markets, is depicted in Figure 1 . Each retailer i; i = 1, . . . , m, can transact with demand market j; j = 1, . . . , n, with Q ij denoting the product transaction from i to j. We intend to study the cybersecurity by introducing for each retailer i; i = 1, . . . , m, his cybersecurity or, simply, security, level s i ; i = 1, . . . , m. We group the product transactions for retailer i; i = 1, . . . , m, into the n-dimensional vector Q i and then we group all such retailer transaction vectors into the mn-dimensional vector Q. The security levels of the retailers are grouped into the m-dimensional vector s.
Then, the cybersecurity level in the supply chain network is the average security and is denoted bys,
. Also, as in ( 32 ), a retailer's vulnerability v i = 1 − s i ; i = 1, . . . , m, and the network
The retailers seek to maximize their individual expected utilities, consisting of expected profits, and compete in a noncooperative game in terms of strategies consisting of their respective product transactions and security levels.
The demand at each demand market j, d j , is assumed to be fixed and known, in contrast to the models 8 , 30 , and 32 . The demand d j must satisfy the following conservation law:
The product transactions have to satisfy capacity constraints and must be nonnegative, so that we have the following conditions:
The cybersecurity level of each retailer i must satisfy the following constraint:
where u si < 1 for all i; i = 1, . . . , m. The larger the value of s i , the higher the security level, with perfect security reflected in a value of 1. However, since, as noted in 30 , we do not expect perfect security to be attainable, we have u si < 1; i = 1, . . . , m. If s i = 0 this means that retailer i has no security.
The demand price of the product at demand market j, ρ j (d, s); j = 1, . . . , n, is a function of the vector of demands and the network security. We can expect consumers to be willing to pay more for higher network security. In view of the conservation of flow equations above, we can defineρ j (Q, s) ≡ ρ j (d, s); j = 1, . . . , n. We assume that the demand price functions are continuously differentiable and concave.
There is an investment cost function h i ; i = 1, . . . , m, associated with achieving a security level s i with the function assumed to be increasing, continuously differentiable and convex. For a given retailer i, h i (0) = 0 denotes an entirely insecure retailer and h i (1) = ∞ is the investment cost associated with complete security for the retailer. An example of an h i (s i ) function that satisfies these properties and that is utilized here (see also 30 ) is The term α i enables distinct retailers to have different investment cost functions based on their size and needs. Such functions have been introduced by 38 and also utilized by 32 . However, in those models, there are no cybersecurity budget constraints and the cybersecurity investment cost functions only appear in the objective functions of the decision-makers.
In the model with nonlinear budget constraints as in 30 each retailer is faced with a limited budget for cybersecurity investment. Hence, the following nonlinear budget constraints must be satisfied:
that is, each retailer can't exceed his allocated cybersecurity budget.
The profit f i of retailer i; i = 1, . . . , m (in the absence of a cyberattack and cybersecurity investment), is the difference between his revenue n j=1ρ j (Q, s)Q ij and his costs associated, respectively, with production and transportation: c i n j=1
where c ij (Q ij ) are convex functions. If there is a successful cyberattack on a retailer i; i = 1, . . . , m, retailer i incurs an expected financial damage given by
where D i , the damage incurred by retailer i, takes on a positive value, and p i is the probability of a successful cyberattack on retailer i, where:
with the term (1 −s) denoting the probability of a cyberattack on the supply chain network and the term (1 − s i ) denoting the probability of success of such an attack on retailer i. We assume that such a probability is a given data on the basis of statistical observations. Each retailer i; i = 1, . . . , m, hence, seeks to maximize his expected utility, E(U i ), corresponding to his expected profit given by:
Let us remark that, because of the assumptions, −E(U i ) is a convex function. Let K i denote the feasible set corresponding to retailer i, where
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We also define
In addition, we define the set of shared constraints S as follows:
We now state the following definition.
Definition 2.1 (A Supply Chain Generalized Nash Equilibrium in Product
Transactions and Security Levels) A product transaction and security level pattern (Q * , s * ) ∈ K, Q * ∈ S, is said to constitute a supply chain Generalized Nash equilibrium if for each retailer i; i = 1, . . . , m,
Hence, according to the above definition, a supply chain Generalized Nash equilibrium is established if no retailer can unilaterally improve upon his expected utility (expected profit) by choosing an alternative vector of product transactions and security level, given the product flow and security level decisions of the other retailers and the demand constraints.
We now provide the linkage that allows us to analyze and determine the equilibrium solution via a variational inequality through a variational equilibrium ( 22 and 24 ).
Definition 2.2 (Variational Equilibrium)
A product transaction and security level pattern (Q * , s * ) is said to be a variational equilibrium of the above Generalized Nash equilibrium if (Q * , s * ) ∈ K, Q * ∈ S, is a solution of the variational inequality
namely, (Q * , s * ) ∈ K, Q * ∈ S, is a supply chain Generalized Nash equilibrium product transaction and 
For convenience, we define now the feasible set K where K ≡ K ∩ S. Problem (10) admits a solution since the classical existence theorem, which requires that the set K is closed, convex, and bounded and the function entering the variational inequality is continuous, is satisfied (see also 26 ).
Equivalent Formulation of the Variational Inequality
The aim of this section is to find an alternative formulation of the variational inequality (9) for the cybersecurity supply chain game theory model with nonlinear budget constraints and conservation laws by means of the Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints defining the feasible set K. To this end, we remark that K can be rewritten in the following way:
and that variational inequality (9) can be equivalently rewritten as a minimization problem. Indeed, by setting:
we have: Then, we can consider the following Lagrange function:
where
It is worth mentioning that Lagrange function (13) is different from the one considered in 10 . Hence, we are able to prove the following result, which is interesting in itself, namely, using the Mangasarian Fromowitz constraint qualification condition, if (Q * , s * ) is a solution of variational inequality (9), we are able to prove that KKT conditions (14) hold and vice versa from KKT conditions (14) variational inequality (9) follows. Moreover, for the first time, to the best of our knowledge, we show that strong duality (17) holds.
Theorem 3.1
The Lagrange multipliers which appear in the Lagrange function (13) exist and, for all i = 1, . . . , m, and j = 1, . . . , n, the following conditions hold:
Moreover, also the strong duality holds true; namely:
= max λ 1 , λ 2 ∈R mn
Proof Since the existence of the solution to problem (10) has been guaranteed, by virtue of the presence of equality constraints, we must apply the KKT theorem (see 20 , Theorem 5.8) in order to obtain the existence of the Lagrange multipliers. Let us denote by (Q * , s * ) the solution to (10) and let us set: 
We remark that: I i (Q * ) ∩ I i (Q * ) = ∅. Define also the matrix:
For the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker theorem under the Mangasarian Fromowitz constraint qualification condition, we must prove that, taking into account that ∇g T i (Q * ) = (−1, . . . , −1), there exists Q ∈ R mn such that −Q ij < 0, i = 1, . . . , m and j ∈ I i (Q * ).
Analogously, since ∇g T i (Q * ) = (1, . . . , 1), we must also prove that there exists Q ∈ R mn such that Q ij < 0, i = 1, . . . , m and j ∈ I i (Q * ).
Such a Q does exist, because it is enough to choose Q ij > 0 when j ∈ I i (Q * ) and Q ij < 0 when
For what concerns the equality constraints
. . , n, we must prove that the matrix ∇h j (Q * ), j = 1, . . . , n is linearly independent and for some vector Q ∈ R mn it must be :
We remark that:
Hence: Such a linear combination is equal to zero if and only if all the coefficients c j ; j = 1, . . . , n, are zero.
As a consequence, ∇h T j (Q * ); j = 1, . . . , n, are linearly independent. Now we have to prove that for a vector Q of the same type as before, we get:
. . .
We note that Q 1j > 0 if j ∈ I 1j (Q * ) and Q 1j < 0 if j ∈ I 1j (Q * ). Moreover, all the components Q ij cannot be simultaneously equal to zero; otherwise, the equality constraint
unsatisfied. At the same time, it cannot be that
Therefore, some Q ij are arbitrarily positive and some Q ij are arbitrarily negative and we can choose them so that (18) is verified. Now, we can proceed with s i ; i = 1, . . . , m. We need to find s * ∈ R m such that:
Moreover, we need:
Hence, it must be that:
We recall that h j (s i ) = (1 − s i )
Then, the Lagrange multipliers λ 1 , λ 2 ∈ R mn + , µ 1 , µ 2 , λ ∈ R m + , γ ∈ R n , do exist and conditions (14) , (15) , and (16) hold true (see Th. 5.8 in 20 ). Since the inequality constraints are linear or convex and the equality constraints are affine linear, the Lagrange function results to be convex on the whole space R 3mn+2n+3m . Then, by virtue of Theorem 3.8, part b in 20 , the point (Q * , s * ) is the minimal solution of the Lagrange function L(Q, s, λ 1 , λ 2 , µ 1 , µ 2 , λ, γ) in the whole space R mn+n .
As a consequence, taking into account (14), we obtain:
see also Theorem 5.17 in 20 for similar remarks. Now, we want to prove the strong duality; namely:
Indeed, for every λ 1 , λ 2 ∈ R mn + , µ 1 , µ 2 ∈ R m + , λ ∈ R m + , γ ∈ R n , we have:
and
, since in the Lagrange function all the terms except V (Q * , s * ) are less than or equal to zero. Moreover,
Further, we also have:
which yields:
and the assertion is proved.
Conditions (14)- (16) represent an equivalent formulation of variational inequality (9) and it is easy to see that from (15) and (16) the variational inequality (9) follows. Indeed, multiplying (15) by (Q ij −Q * ij ) we obtain:
and, taking into account (14), we have:
Analogously, multiplying (16) by (s i − s * i ), we get:
From (14), we have:
is a nondecreasing function; hence, it attains its maximum value at s * i = u si . Therefore, we get: 
For the above calculations variational inequality (9) easily follows. The term ∂E(U i (Q * , s * )) ∂Q ij is called the marginal expected transaction utility, i = 1, . . . , m; j = 1, . . . , n, and the term ∂E(U i (Q * , s * )) ∂s i is called the marginal expected cybersecurity investment utility, i = 1, . . . , m. Our aim is to study such marginal expected utilities by means of (14)- (16 
Analysis of Marginal Expected Transaction Utilities and of Marginal Expected Cybersecurity Investment Utilities
From (15) we get
So, if 0 < Q * ij < Q ij , then we get (see also (10)) 
Now let us analyze the meaning of equalities (20)- (22) . From equality (20) , which holds when 0 < Q * ij < Q ij , we see that for retailer i, who transfers the product Q * ij to the demand market j, the marginal expected transaction utility is −γ j . We remark that −γ j ∈ R, but its sign depends on the difference between the marginal expected transaction cost c i + ∂c ij (Q * ij ) ∂Q ij and the marginal expected transaction
Then the positive situation is the one when γ j > 0 so that the marginal expected transaction revenues exceed the costs. Equality (21) shows that, when there is no trade between retailer i and demand market j; namely, λ 1 ij > 0 and equality (21) holds, then the marginal expected transaction utility decreases, whereas if λ 2 ij > 0; namely, Q * ij = Q ij , then the marginal expected transaction utility increases. In conclusion, we remark that the Lagrange variables γ j , λ The analysis of marginal expected cybersecurity investment utilities is the same as the one performed in subsection 3.2 in 8 as well as the stability of the marginal expected cybersecurity investment utilities is the same as the one performed in subsection 3.3 in 8 , but we report them here for the reader's convenience. From (16) we have:
If 0 < s * i < u si , then µ 1 i = µ 2 i = 0 and we have (see also (10))
Since 0 < s * i < u si , h(s * i ) cannot be the upper bound B i ; hence, λ i is zero and (24) becomes:
Equality (25) shows that the marginal expected cybersecurity cost is equal to the marginal expected cybersecurity investment revenue plus the term 1 − If µ 1 i > 0 and, hence, s * i = 0, and µ 2 i = 0, we get:
In (26) minus the marginal expected cybersecurity investment utility is equal to µ 1 i ; hence, the marginal expected cybersecurity cost is greater than the marginal expected cybersecurity investment revenue plus the marginal damage expense. Then the marginal expected cybersecurity investment revenue is less than the marginal expected cybersecurity cost minus the marginal damage expense. We note that case (26) can occur if ∂h i (0) ∂s i is strictly positive.
In contrast, if µ 2 i > 0 and, hence, s * i = u si , retailer j has a marginal gain given by µ 2 i , because
We note that λ i could also be positive, since, with s * i = u si , h i (s i ) could reach the upper bound B i . In (27) minus the marginal expected cybersecurity investment utility is equal to −µ 2 i . Hence, the marginal expected cybersecurity cost is less than the marginal expected cybersecurity investment revenue plus the marginal damage expense. Then the marginal expected cybersecurity investment revenue is greater than the marginal expected cybersecurity cost minus the marginal damage expense.
From (27) we see the importance of the Lagrange variables µ 1 i , µ 2 i which describe the effects of the marginal expected cybersecurity investment utilities. Now let us consider the three cases related to the studied marginal expected cybersecurity investment utilities. Each of these cases holds for certain values of the damage D i . Let us consider the value D i for which the first case (25) occurs. We see that in this case there is a unique value of D i for which (25) holds and if we vary such a value, also the value s * i in (25) varies. Now let us consider the value D i for which (26) holds and let us call D * i the value of D i for which we have
Then for 0 < D i < D * i the solution (Q * , s * ) to variational inequality (9) remains unchanged because (26) still holds for these new values of D i and the marginal expected cybersecurity investment utility remains negative, but it is increasing with respect to D i . Analogously, if we consider the value D i for which (27) holds and call D * i the value such that
we see that for D i > D * i the solution (Q * , s * ) to (9) remains unchanged because (27) still holds and the marginal expected cybersecurity investment utility remains positive and is increasing with respect to D i .
Numerical Examples
The numerical examples consist of a supply chain network with two retailers and two demand markets as depicted in Fig. 2 .
For i = 1, 2 we obtain:
Now, we wish to determine the equilibrium solution, taking into account the different values assumed by λ 1 , λ 2 , µ 1 , µ 2 , and λ, and searching, among them, the feasible ones. After some algebraic calculations, we realize that for i = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2 we get the solution when λ 1 ij = λ 2 ij = µ 1 i = λ i = 0, and µ 2 i > 0. Hence, s * 1 = s * 2 = 0.91 (which is the maximum value). In this case, the marginal expected transaction utilities are zero, whereas the marginal expected cybersecurity investment utilities are positive; namely, there is a marginal gain, given by µ 2 i , i = 1, 2. Solving the system: namely: The previous system, in the five examined cases, has been solved using Wolfram Alpha and the solutions are summarized in Table 1 . In particular, we have reported the flows, the cybersecurity levels, the retailers' vulnerability, the network vulnerability, the Lagrange multipliers associated to the conservation laws and to the constraints on cybersecurity levels, in equilibrium. We remark that, since the retailers invest at the upper bound levels of security, both the individual retailers' vulnerability, v 1 and v 2 , and that of the network,v, are low. Moreover, the demand prices charged by the retailers and the expected utilities of each retailer, in the five cases, are summarized in Table 2 .
Comparing the different results, we see that, for some values of the demands, the marginal expected transaction utilities, γ 1 and γ 2 , have a positive value; for other values of the demands, γ 1 and γ 2 have negative values, and, when the demand is not fixed at the values above, γ 1 and γ 2 are zero. On the contrary, the marginal cybersecurity investment utilities µ 2 1 and µ 2 2 are always increasing when the fixed demands increase too and have a small value when the demands are not fixed. Further, for the corresponding values of the demands, the expected utilities, E(U i ); i = 1, 2, achieve the maximum value; for the other values of the demands, E(U i ) decrease and, when the demands are not fixed, then E(U i ) assumes a value which is less than the maximum obtained with certain fixed demands. As a conclusion, we can deduce that the problem has an optimal demand which yields optimal expected utilities and a good value of marginal cybersecurity expected utilities, whereas, when the demands are not fixed, we get a value of cybersecurity expected utilities which is not necessarily the optimal one.
Keeping the same structure as the one depicted in Fig. 2 , now we study the cybersecurity by introducing the possibility, for each retailer i = 1, 2, to have different investment cost functions based on their different sizes and needs. We assume that the cost functions, the demand price functions, the damage parameters, the budgets for the two retailers, the bounds on the security level, the product transactions capacities are given and are the same as in the previous example, but we suppose now that the investment cost functions are the following:
Therefore, we are setting α 1 = 2 and α 2 = 3.
In Table 3 we present the solutions, for the five examined cases, computed using the MatLab program.
In particular we remark that, since the cybersecurity levels are not equal to their upper bounds (s i < u si ) and the budget constraints are satisfied with equality signs, namely, both retailers use the whole budget, we have:μ 2 i = 0 andλ i = 0. Comparing the different results, we notice that the product transactions Q * ij in equilibrium are very similar to the previous ones (when α 1 = α 2 = 1) but now the cybersecurity levels are lower, specially when α i is higher; obviously, in this case, the vulnerability values are bigger. From Table 4 we also see that the marginal expected cybersecurity investment utilities over the marginal expected cybersecurity costs, the Lagrange multipliersλ 1 andλ 2 , are always increasing when the demands increase too.
Furthermore, sinceλ i > 0 and ∂h i (s * ) ∂s i > 0, i = 1, 2, for every case, we have that ∂E(U i ) ∂s i > 0.
Moreover, the demand prices charged by the retailers and the expected utilities of each retailer, in the five cases with α 1 = 2 and α 2 = 3, are summarized in Table 4 . Table 4 Demand prices and expected utilities with α1 = 2 and α2 = 3
Conclusions
In this paper, we introduced a cybersecurity investment supply chain game theory model consisting of retailers and consumers at demand markets assuming that the demands for the product at the demand markets are known and fixed and, hence, the conservation law of each demand market is fulfilled. The model also has nonlinear budget constraints. This model is a Generalized Nash equilibrium model since not only are the retailers' expected utility functions dependent on one another's strategies but their feasible sets are as well. We proposed a variational equilibrium which allows us to formulate the governing equilibrium conditions as a variational inequality problem, rather than a quasi-variational inequality. We also studied the dual problem and, specifically, we analyzed the Lagrange multipliers associated with the conservation laws and the expected utilities when the demands change. In particular, we have seen that, for certain values of the fixed demand, we can attain the best expected utilities with respect to the demand. In the future we would like to continue the study of this topic and, in particular, we will take into account uncertainty on the data which leads to a random formulation of the model (see also 4 for an application to the traffic network models).
The results in this paper add to the growing literature of operations research and game theory techniques for cybersecurity modeling and analysis.
